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devils and angels, which satisfy his operational definition of a "god" as 
a "very powerful non-embodied rational agent."" Is polytheism viable 
under a more robust notion of deity as well? That depends on whether 
this notion involves any exclusive relations like being the creator of the 
world. Such a property could be multiply instantiated only if there is 
more than one world. This possibility, Mavrodes argues, is either meta-
physically objectionable or religiously unsatisfactory; consequently ex-
clusive relations set a limit on any viable polytheism. 
It should be evident from these thumbnail sketches that this volume 
contains a diversity of riches, some in the form of analytic rigor, others 
in hermeneutical insight, and yet others in their sheer suggestiveness. 
Though some of these essays engaged my thinking more than others, 
this reflects more my own idiosyncratic interests than any unevenness in 
the collection. It is because the essays are of a uniformly high quality 
that I have avoided selecting a few for critical appraisal while neglecting 
the others. There is much to ponder here, especially for Christian 
philosophers interested in the epistemology of religious belief. 
NOTES 
1. Page 15. 
2. Page 37. 
3. This is one place where Alston's work is overlooked but might have 
been incorporated into the argument with some profit. I am thinking of his 
"Divine and Human Action," in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca & London: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), pp. 257-280. 
4. "The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look," in Daniel 
Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 1996). 
5. Page 194. 
6. Page 219. 
7. Page 258. 
8. Page 278. 
9. Page 264. Mavrodes borrows this definition from Richard 
Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 53. 
Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life, by Mikael Stenmark. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. Pp. xi, 392. 
$32.95(cloth). 
THOMAS D. SULLIVAN, University of St. Thomas 
This book is a wide ranging and well informed general inquiry into 
rationality. Though religious belief is just one of the areas investigated, 
it receives special attention. 
As Stenmark sees it, a theory of rationality lays down principles for 
how we should conduct our cognitive affairs. Four models are consid-
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ered, the way of 0) the formal evidentialist, (2) the social evidentialist, 
(3) the presumptionist, and (4) the contextualist. The formal evidential-
ist identifies rationality with following appropriate rules, largely deter-
mined il priori. The social evidentialist rejects the idea that all rationality 
is rule governed, seeing rationality instead as a process guided by the 
exercise of informed judgment exposed to peer evaluation. These two 
ways of specifying rationality share a commitment to evidentialism, the 
view that people are entitled to accept a belief only if there are good rea-
sons for holding it. A presumptionist rejects evidentialism; we are ratio-
nal in holding on to our beliefs until we have special reasons to abandon 
them. This is the model Stenmark favors, chiefly on the grounds that we 
have to make choices with only limited time and cognitive resources 
available to us, and there is more to life than checking out the truth of 
our beliefs. We cannot live a rational life by acting in accord with evi-
dentialism. 
However, against the presumptionist model Stenmark favors, as well 
as the evidentialist models he rejects, a proponent of a fourth model of 
rationality, the contextualist, will claim that there is no overarching stan-
dard of rationality by which we can measure radically different practices 
and beliefs within those practices. Stenmark carefully distinguishes 
claims made by contextualists of different stripes, examining in some 
detail ideas of Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips, Peter Winch, and Alasdaire 
McIntyre. Stenmark agrees with some of the weaker claims of contextu-
alists, e.g., that rationality is always used in a practice of some sort or 
other, but he argues against the crucial claim that there are no standards 
of rationality applicable to all practices. Although the means we use to 
satisfy the universal demand for rationality vary with time and circum-
stance, "the nature of rationality is the same; rationality is a matter of 
doing (believing, acting, and evaluating) what we ought intellectually 
ought to do and can realistically manage to do, so that in our circum-
stances we choose appropriate ends and means to achieve these ends" 
(p. 358). So there is indeed a transcendent concept of rationality that can 
be applied to all agents, whatever their concerns at the moment. 
Stenmark contends that much discussion of rationality in the philoso-
phy of religion is "religiously irrelevant because it does not take into 
account the actual aim or function of religious practice or the actual situ-
ation in which it is pursued" (p. 358). We experience suffering, guilt, 
feelings of meaninglessness, and death. We properly value practices 
that make sense of all this and help us deal with the challenges. "This 
also means that ultimately the acceptance of religion (or some secular 
alternative) is an existential choice. What is at stake is not only whether 
some beliefs are true or what conclusion we should draw regarding cer-
tain arguments, but how we actually should live our lives" (p. 358). 
Religious belief can be rational because the religious believer may be 
doing what can reasonably be expected with respect to the regulation of 
an overarching view of life. 
Stenmark builds a powerful case for presumptionism in general and 
for the rationality of religious belief. But even those inclined to assent 
may be left with an uneasy feeling that something is out of focus. For 
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one thing, Stenmark at times seems too eager to marginalize the role of 
evidence and argument. For example, in the course of summarizing his 
argument at the end of the book, Stenmark writes: 
But is it then rational for people to have - in their predicament -
religious beliefs? Since all human beings have to deal with existen-
tial experiences of resistance, the issue is not "Shall we have a view 
of life?" but "Which view should we choose?" because we have to 
make a choice. If we do not vote with our head we vote with our 
feet. So the question is neither whether religious beliefs are scien-
tifically acceptable nor whether religious beliefs can be supported 
by sufficient evidence, but whether one should be a religious or 
secular believer of one kind or another (p. 359). 
Well, yes, the question is not about evidential support, but then neither 
is the question about whether one should be religious or secular. There 
is more than one important question, and these important questions are 
interconnected. One may as well say the question is not whether evi-
dence warrants belief that the food is safe to eat, but whether we are 
going to eat it or not. Presumably if it turns out that the evidence quite 
clearly shows that religious beliefs are all rotten at the core, then we 
should not choose a religious mode of life. We certainly cannot just 
shrug and say that the question is not about argument and evidence. 
Stenmark surely does not think that religious believers have a right to 
refuse to consider counter-evidence to their position - he says as much 
even while insisting that the question is not about evidence (p. 359) -
but his language about the role of evidence and argument is sometimes 
misleading at best. 
Another source of unease is the claim that "because a view of life is 
better than none" a religious believer such as a Muslim living in a small 
village in Iraq should hold on to his beliefs even in the teeth of adequate 
counter-evidence against Islam, provided there is no other life option for 
him or her (p. 276). On this view, a prophet who keeps prematurely 
dating the end of the world should be believed anyway if followers can-
not figure out a better world view than what the prophet has offered. 
This is hard to swallow. And it is even harder to accept the idea that it is 
reasonable for someone to hold on to a vicious secular creed like Nazism 
when the individual believes there is adequate evidence against it. But 
that it could be reasonable appears to be the clear implication of the gen-
eral claim that "even if there exists adequate counter-evidence that 
makes it unlikely the belief is true, we should not abandon it until we 
have something better, a rival belief to put in its place, given of course 
that we cannot withhold judgment" (p. 276; emphasis in the text). 
Really? I am caught in a burning building and the door gives every 
appearance of being locked. I have to make a choice. But why must I 
continue to try to tell myself the door offers a way out when it is pretty 
clear that it doesn't? The first step toward finding a way out might well 
require letting go of the handle that turns without effect. 
A third reservation even a presumptionist might have concerns 
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Stenmark's reluctance to allow "the primary scientific standard of pre-
dictability" to be applied at any point to religious belief (p. 309). Of 
course we cannot routinely test religious claims by putting them to a test 
in the lab, but it seems far from clear that applying the principle of pre-
dictability is always inappropriate. Jesus says to a paralytic, "That you 
may know the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins on earth, I 
say to you arise, take up your pallet and go to your house" (Luke 5: 24). 
Wouldn't the paralytic or a bystander be justified in assessing the 
hypothesis This person has the power to forgive sins in light of the predic-
tion The paralytic will rise, especially given that Jesus says "That you may 
know ... "? It is reported in the Acts of the Apostles (c. 5) that Gamaliel, a 
member of the Sanhedren, argued that if the work of the followers of 
Jesus was of men it would not succeed, but if of God, it could not be 
crushed. It is hard to see what is wrong with Gamaliel's way of reason-
ing or how this way of reasoning is not tantamount to proposing a 
testable hypothesis. And why couldn't one rightly reason that if partici-
pation in a church's life only seems to make people worse, then it proba-
bly is not of God? It might be objected that this is to treat religious 
beliefs as hypotheses; and whatever they are they clearly are not that. 
But as Stenmark himself observes when commenting on the refusal of D. 
Z. Phillips, Alvin Plantinga, and others to accept religious language as 
expressing hypotheses, even if there is something wrong about calling a 
settled conviction of a believer a "hypothesis," the proposition at issue 
can certainly be treated as one by a person only looking into the matter 
(p.325). 
Here and there, then, Stenmark burdens the main argument of his 
book with misleading statements and dubious contentions inessential to 
the case. Nonetheless, Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life is 
an impressive work, widely informed, penetrating, and on the main 
point quite convincing. 
God, Knowledge & Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Peter van 
Inwagen. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 284. $17.95. 
FRANCES & DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington 
University & Seattle Pacific University 
This volume collects nine essays published by Peter van Inwagen 
between 1977 and 1995. Part I features, among other things, modal skep-
ticism with respect to ontological arguments and arguments from evil. 
Part II addresses certain tensions Christians may feel between modern 
biology, critical studies of the New Testament, and the comparative 
study of religions, on the one hand, and Christian orthodoxy, on the 
other. Part III deploys a formal logic of relative identity to model the 
internal consistency of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. In what follows, we summarize and reflect on five essays.' 
"Ontological Arguments" focuses on valid arguments by that name 
